Slum upgrading and urban governance: Case studies in three South East Asian cities

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ABSTRACT

Whilst slum upgrading is often seen as one of the more effective ways of tackling urban poverty, the approaches taken by slum upgrading policies vary considerably, as do their degrees of success. This article reports on a comparative study of slum upgrading experiences in Bandung, Indonesia; Quezon City, Philippines; and Hanoi, Vietnam. It was carried out using a modification of the sustainable livelihoods framework that considered upgrading policies in a hierarchy of levels. The study demonstrated the importance of some form of security of tenure (the definition of which varied across the case studies), a need for sustainable economic activities to be incorporated into the upgrading, the critical importance of governance and institutions and significance of the contributions of the community and elements of civil society.

Introduction

Slums have become “part of the sum and substance of cities in the South” (Milbert, 2010: 300). In fact, slum dwellers “of the new millennium… include one out of every three city dwellers, a billion people, a sixth of the world’s population” (United Nations Population Fund, 2007: 16). The improvement of the lives of slum dwellers is a target of the Millennium Development Goals although progress is slow (UNDP, 2010: 62).

Slums are often concentrations of urban poverty although not all slum dwellers are poor and there is debate about the place of slums in the formal/informal continuum of urban livelihoods (Roy, 2005). Approaches to dealing with slums have ranged from demolition and resettlement to formalisation of the informal (Wekesa, Steyn, & Otiene, 2011; Wirlin, 1999, 2010). A common approach is to upgrade slum settlements in various ways (Wirlin, 1999) to improve settlement conditions with minimum displacement of residents.

This paper reports on an investigation of three case study cities in which upgrading policies of different kinds have been implemented.

Slum upgrading approaches

A crucial weakness of interventions in the past has been the failure to ensure that governance arrangements can ensure on-going maintenance and up-scaling of improvements (Van Horen, 2004). At its most basic, slum upgrading can focus on the improvement of physical services such as roads and drainage. More frequently it encompasses these plus improving the quality of housing. Some programs also provide more secure forms of tenure. The ultimately most useful approach, however, is one that also includes changes to urban governance so that community capital can be maintained and improved over the longer term. The possibilities are best described through the hierarchy shown in Fig. 1. This hierarchy is often implied in the literature (Wekesa, Steyn & Otiene, 2011) but Fig. 1 explicates the relationships.

Because slums are associated with poverty, understanding slum upgrading requires an understanding of poverty. The most simplistic way of conceptualising poverty is through a single income measure, the poverty line, calculated in relation to standardised...
household needs. A more comprehensive approach is to relate poverty to the resources available to poor households. Early efforts to use this resource-based method (Chambers & Gordon, 1991) were focused on rural poverty. The advantage of this approach is that it focuses on ‘sustainable livelihoods’. The principles of the sustainable livelihoods approach have now been applied to urban areas (e.g. Mandke, 2007; Rakodi, 2002), based on the identification of ‘capitals’ (human, social, economic, natural and physical) utilised by the poor. The approach used here modified this framework to incorporate aspects of on-going governance as shown in Fig. 2.

The South East Asian case studies

In 2010 some 31% of urban dwellers in South East Asia, approximately 88 million people, lived in slums as defined by UN-Habitat (UN-Habitat, 2003, 2010). The present paper reports on a comparative study conducted between 2005 and 2008 in urban slums in three South East Asian cities: Bandung in Indonesia, Quezon City in the Philippines, and Hanoi in Vietnam. The case studies present three varied approaches to slum upgrading: Bandung because of the long history of centralised top-down upgrading in Indonesia, Quezon City because of the mixture of centralised and community approaches that characterise Philippine slum upgrading, and Hanoi because of its public ownership of land but complex registration system that acts as a counterpoint to the common concern about land tenure security in slum upgrading. The three cases also highlight the important role of institutional arrangements within their very different social and political contexts. Such comparisons of disparate cases have in the past yielded rewarding results (Minnery, Storey, & Setyono, 2012).

Field research in the three countries was conducted between 2005 and 2008 via focus groups, targeted interviews with key government and community stakeholders, analysis of official and unofficial documents, site inspections and analyses, and interviews with residents in the case study locations.

Indonesia: slum upgrading in the Repelita

In every Repelita (National Development Plan) since the mid-1960s slum upgrading has been a key part of Indonesia’s strategy for poverty alleviation. Thus, slum upgrading in Indonesia has a long history. There have been three ‘generations’ of these policies. The Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) initiated in Jakarta in 1969 has been called “the world’s first slum upgrading programme” (Juliman & Durrendon, 2006). Funded by the Jakarta City Administration and the World Bank, the KIP focussed on improving physical conditions by providing basic infrastructure and upgrading housing (Tunas & Peresthu, 2010). It became a model for slum improvement in other parts of Indonesia, including the city of Bandung.

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Fig. 1. Elements of urban upgrading. (Source: Van Horen, 2004)
The second generation approaches ran from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. They attempted to integrate physical, social and economic improvements. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 forced the government into a third generation of programs to deal with the sudden escalation of levels of poverty. This included the JPS Jaring Pengaman Sosial (Social Safety Net) and P2KP Program Pengentasan Kemiskinan Perkotaan (Urban Poverty Alleviation Program). These programs integrated physical, social and economic improvements but also incorporated livelihood enhancements. The strategy was formally included in the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2004–2009 (Government of Indonesia, 2005). All three generations of slum upgrading in Indonesia were initiated at the national level with local government reacting to and implementing national initiatives.

Case study: Bandung City

Bandung City became a municipality in 1906. By 1987 its administrative area had expanded to twice its original size. In 2001 the wider Bandung Metropolitan Area (BMA) was created. The rapid expansion of the BMA mirrored the dynamic industrialization of Indonesia at the national and regional levels (Winarso & Firman, 2002). Bandung became a centre of manufacturing, hi-tech industrial estates, higher educational and research centres and commercial services. The resultant in-migration caused a significant increase in housing demand. Most of the low-cost housing was concentrated in the densely populated southern part of the city close to commercial areas, with a large percentage classified as semi-permanent, temporary or ‘improper’ (located in areas not allotted for residential purposes). Some of the poorer housing areas were flood-prone.

The BMA is divided into 26 Kecamatan (sub-districts) and 139 Kelurahan (‘village’ districts). Slum upgrading projects were targeted at the Kelurahan level or below. The four case study areas within Bandung City were:

- Kelurahan Cikutra
- Kelurahan Padasuka
- Industri Dalam
- Kelurahan Situsaeur

Bandung has implemented several slum upgrading projects spanning Indonesia’s three generations of approaches. The case studies cover each of these policy generations.

Kelurahan Cikutra was a target of the first generation approach, the UNEP-Experiment (1978–1980). This project focused on the improvement of sanitation and waste disposal management with social and economic improvements piggy-backing on these. The project consulted the community during the planning phase and used community labour during construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure. This participation was achieved through village leaders and activity groups, promoting the establishment of cooperatives (Koperasi Serba Usaha, KSU). It incorporated training allied with waste disposal, construction and health awareness. The cooperatives were successful in garnering support for the upgrading and participation of community members, demonstrating that local managers of cooperatives could work with project teams to achieve results and organize loans. However, a number of recipients defaulted on their loans after a few months and fieldwork in 2007 showed that even the physical assets had deteriorated.

Kelurahan Padasuka, a flood-prone area, was a second generation project, part of the Bandung Urban Development Program (BUDP I, 1981–1986). While focussing on physical infrastructure provision (roads, drainage, waste collection and particularly flood control), it also stressed social and economic components and attempted to involve the community. In 2007 the physical and natural assets were still intact, largely because of their importance in flood control, and economic activities were also retained.

Industri Dalam was a squatter settlement in the centre of Bandung, on partly vacant and partly industrial land with no water supply or sanitation. Most of the migrants in the settlement were engaged in the informal economy. The community was the target of the PLPKP2 (Urban Revitalization and Housing Development), part of the second generation of slum upgrading, beginning in 1990. It focussed on building maisonettes on government land to accommodate squatter residents. The program did not engage the community in the planning stage so the community’s role was unclear. In addition, because there was insufficient attention to the economic situation of tenants, they could not keep up loan repayments and cooperatives here eventually had to close but the physical housing and infrastructure assets have remained.
Kelurahan Situsaeur was a community in which most people who had jobs were traders, servants or small entrepreneurs, but unemployment was also high. It was a third generation project, part of the P2KP (Urban Poverty Alleviation Program) in the mid-1990s aligned to the national Social Safety Net (JPS) Program. This was a far more integrated approach to upgrading taking into account the livelihoods of slum dwellers to create economic autonomy. It did achieve some short-term success in building physical and economic assets in the community but not to the anticipated extent. Again, the community’s productive assets were not self-sustaining.

Lessons from Bandung

Early assessment of the Bandung projects (Wilhelmus Hofsteede Consultants, 1980) was generally favourable. Long-term assessment (Tampubolon, 2007) has shown that the positive gains were not enduring. The financial crisis of 1997/8 brought problems to cooperatives. Many were unable to repay their loans and were forced to close. The P2KP program, aimed at enhancing the productive assets of the communities, was implemented across Indonesia in response to the economic crisis. By 2007, however, of the 134 Kelurahan that received a P2KP project in Bandung, less than 30% were still able to manage their activities (Tampubolon, 2007). Generally, community capability to maintain the results of upgrading was not achieved.

There has been a longer-lasting physical and social legacy from the earlier physical-focused upgrades. The early UNEP-experiment in Bandung successfully promoted the building of social assets in the community through the establishment of cooperatives and integrating construction with ‘on the job’ training. A possible reason for its lasting legacy is that there was no ambiguity in how funds had to be spent. All funds were focused on physical upgrading, including training efforts. Later programs tried to address physical, economic and social conditions, but the available funding was not commensurate with the expanded purposes. The top-down approach also meant that community participation was poorly developed; the lack of clear community purpose hindered the retention of both social cohesion and economic opportunities (RTTP, 2008).

The Philippines: slum upgrading with civil society

In the Philippines slum upgrading has been a mix of national and city government initiatives, civil society involvement and international donor agency support (Lee, 1985). City governments have offices whose roles are dedicated to slum upgrading, housing construction and the related concerns of their urban poor constituency. Slum upgrading is a key strategy in national poverty alleviation pursued through relocation and resettlement but civil society is heavily involved in partnership with government.

Two pieces of national legislation provide the context for both slum upgrading and social housing: the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992. The LGC devolved considerable powers and responsibilities to local governments, including that for providing basic services. It supported the participation of civil society groups in governance. The UDHA addressed multiple urbanisation concerns, including the provision of land tenure and housing for the urban poor, and promoted public participation in the development process.

Case study: Quezon City

Quezon City was created as a municipality in 1939 to help relieve the congestion of Manila. Early formal residential development was along the city’s southern boundary with Manila, but informal settlements also sprang up as the city grew. Demolition of informal settlements in Manila in the 1960s and 1970s brought waves of migrant settlers to the unoccupied areas of Quezon City (Veneracion, 2008).

The concerns of the urban poor are addressed through the Urban Poor Affairs Office (UPAO), created in 1986 and directly under the Mayor’s Office. UPAO is responsible for administering censuses, mapping of informal settlements and conducting studies which aim to improve the conditions of the poor. From 1992 to 2007, UPAO assisted in the relocation of nearly 9000 families to areas outside Metro Manila. This included financial aid to compensate for income lost during relocations and help with hauling dismantled houses and other belongings. In the same period, UPAO resettled about 3000 households to areas within Quezon City either to government lands or private properties (Balbin, 2008).

The Housing and Urban Renewal Authority Inc. (HURA), created in 2003, is a local-government-owned and controlled corporate entity charged with providing affordable housing to low-income residents. It is mandated to “upgrade, renew or redevelop slums and other blighted urban communities, develop resettlement sites and generally to enhance and promote urban development” (Veneracion, 2008: 19). A number of other city offices also deal with aspects of slum upgrading, as do of course large development and national agencies. The National Housing Authority (NHA) has had the longest involvement in slum upgrading and resettlement within Quezon City. Many local government and slum upgrading agencies work in conjunction with the national Community Mortgage Program (CMP) for land acquisition, site development and housing construction. Although the CMP is innovative and focused on the urban poor it has not yet achieved its annual targets or made a substantial impact on the country’s need for housing for the urban poor (Veneracion, 2004).

The research reported here focused on five communities within Quezon City:

- Sitio Dormitory, Barangay Nagkaisang Nayon
- Pamana Village, Barangay Santa Lucia
- Sitio Santo Niño, Barangay Greater Fairview
- Golden Shower, Barangay Payatas
- Brookside-3 Village, Barangay Bagong Silangan

These case studies were selected because of their general development status and to demonstrate varying partnership arrangements with external groups. They also had an active local community organisation as well as an NGO partner which worked with the Quezon City government in site upgrading and community development.

At the time of the fieldwork in 2007 Dormitory and Pamana residents had successfully negotiated legal acquisition of the land they had informally occupied. Their main concerns were meeting their CMP loan repayments and other financial obligations so as not to lose the legal right to their land. Golden Shower residents were still working on their CMP loan application to purchase the land that they had informally occupied for a significant period of time. Bridging finance had been obtained and was expected to be paid back when the CMP loan was finalized. When the upgrading project was officially concluded in 2004 the CMP loan had yet to be received but by 2007 they were still unable to meet their financial obligations for the loan requirements. Brookside-3 residents felt that they could eventually claim tenure from Quezon City government which had indicated interest in selling land to the relocatees. The case of Santo Niño is an unfortunate example of how things can go wrong. While confident that they had successfully negotiated a land tenure agreement, the residents were being threatened by the fact that when their land was originally bequeathed to the City by a private company there was a stipulation that it must be used for open space, otherwise it would
revert back to the donor. The use of land for residential purposes contravened this condition. This discrepancy has effectively stalled progress towards security of tenure (Veneracion, 2008).

**Lessons from Quezon City**

The most striking aspect of slum upgrading in the Philippines is the strong role of civil society. Politically active groups include community-based organizations, family and corporate foundations, socio-civic clubs, faith-based groups and other non-government organisations (NGOs). Arguably, the gains made in slum upgrading in the Philippines would not have been possible without the determined and often militant efforts by these groups. A dynamic NGO community has increasingly been viewed as a major conduit of international financial assistance to urban poor communities, including funds from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. NGOs have aided urban poor communities in gaining basic services, improved physical infrastructure, land tenure security and in providing leadership training. Civil society groups have demonstrated their strong capability to mobilize resources in contributing to urban upgrading needs.

The experiences of the communities studied in Quezon City provide evidence that acquiring improved tenure security and better physical infrastructure can transform informal settlements. The increased sense of security can inspire residents to upgrade their own housing conditions. In Dormitory, Golden Shower, and Brookside, external funds enabled the physical upgrading of sites and housing to the extent that these three communities are no longer tagged as urban slums. Maintenance of loan repayments, however, would be problematic if livelihoods failed. Land tenure and finance availability dominated concerns in these communities.

**Vietnam: slum upgrading in a centralised state**

The transformation of Vietnam’s planned economy since the introduction of Doi Moi in 1986 has brought profound changes to its cities. Foreign investment and development efforts focussing on industrialisation of the major cities have resulted in increased rural-urban labour flows to the large cities and a strengthening of the informal economy which provides jobs for immigrants. This, however, has further increased demand for housing so that the policy has had “a negative effect on housing the poor” (Coit, 1998: 273). Urban development is now a transitional mix of state control and market mechanisms (Quang & Kammeyer, 2002), leading to a move from state housing provision to some degree of privatisation. Inevitably, residents with higher social status and income are better placed to access the new housing market, widening the socio-economic gap and increasing the level of informal and illegal housing. However, the research identified that there is no equivalent of the term ‘slum’ in the official Vietnamese policy documents — upgrading deals with illegality (in its various forms) and poor quality housing and so may not be directly targeted at reducing poverty.

In order to ease the urgent need for low-cost housing for the poor, the central government adopted a policy of renovation of degraded areas, changing them into commercial areas and relocating squatters. The Vietnam Urban Upgrading Project (VUUP) was launched in 2004 with the support of the World Bank using the approach of in-situ upgrading of low-income housing in Can Tho, Haiphong, Ho Chi Minh City and Nam Dinh (but not Hanoi) (Coulthart, Quang, & Sharpe, 2006). This project was scaled up as a National Urban Upgrading Program in 2005.

**Case study: Hanoi**

Hanoi has had a rapidly growing population in the last two decades, especially through migration of unskilled labour from the rural areas, but infrastructure investments have lagged far behind demand. The housing stock in Hanoi is seriously inadequate, unevenly distributed and much is degraded, sub-standard or illegal informal housing on public lands. It is estimated that 30% of Hanoi residents live in very crowded conditions (Coulthart et al., 2006). Prior to Doi Moi the state limited migration through a permit system. Since the late 1980s urbanisation has been characterised by unplanned land-use, uncontrolled construction and degradation of municipal social and physical infrastructure. The residential registration system for households still exists. There has been an “emergence of semi-legal and illegal housing activities such as building and renovation of houses by urban dwellers without official permission and licences, sub-letting and various forms of trade in land and houses” (UMC, 2008: 19). The provision of appropriate housing for low-income people remains a major challenge for the government (Coulthart et al., 2006).

The three Vietnamese case studies are typical of informal housing in Hanoi.

Chuong Duong is in central Hanoi adjacent to the Hong River. The area was previously owned by State forestry companies but in 1990 some land was provided for state employees to construct houses. Informal settlements followed. The site now has mixed land-uses with older residential multi-storey apartments and commercial offices. Most of the single-storey houses were constructed without building permits. The area is zoned for future open space in the City Plan so no official residential building permits have been issued.

Tuong Mai, in the south of Hanoi, is an area originally of fertile agricultural land. Army housing was constructed on the site but informal settlement followed. In 1994 many households here were permitted to change their land tenure from agricultural to residential. In some areas landowners themselves have invested in building roads, water and electricity supply as well as wastewater disposal in an attempt to raise the land value and attract buyers. In 2004 the site was the target of government clearance projects, affecting many residents.

Thanh Cong is an illegal settlement on a rubbish dump. There are about 700 households, with the majority registered as KT2 and about 300 as KT4 (UMC, 2008: 22). Initially most of the houses were constructed using timber, but since 2000 almost all have been replaced by brick construction with metal or tiled roofing. The only infrastructure in this area has been provided by residents themselves. There are restrictions on building permits because the government plans to clear part of the site to construct a sports complex, a plan which will affect many households. Some residents are government workers, with secondary and even tertiary education, but the majority of incomes in this community are earned in the informal sector.

**Lessons from Hanoi**

The most significant lessons were the legacy of dilapidated centrally-planned state housing and the tyranny of the complex permit system for land tenure, construction, housing and occupation. After 1986 Doi Moi policy changes the government permit system became extremely cumbersome, complicated by the new market-oriented conditions. Delays in issuing land-use certificates contributed to urban sprawl as Hanoi saw the emergence of much

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1. There are four categories. KT1: the person lives at the same address as registered; KT2 the person lives at a different place to that in the resident book but still in the same province; KT3: the person does not live where registered but is registered as a temporary resident in another province; and KT4: the person lives at the registered address but works temporarily in another province (UMC, 2008).
semi-legal and informal housing activity such as building and renovation of houses on public lands without official permission, sub-letting and buying and selling of land and houses without official documentation (UMC, 2008).

All land is still owned by the state, so it is only possible to purchase land-use rights but not ownership (under seven categories) for which certificates are issued. However, as Coit noted in 1998 (p. 277) while land “is officially the collective property of the people of Vietnam, the right to use the land, and the right to build on it, gradually has been treated as property”. The permit system means that legal land-use rights certificates are issued only where there is a family record book verifying permanent residency in Hanoi for a significant period of time, and the local authority verifies that there was no disputed claim on the land, and there is verification that the state has no development plans for the area. Many households in the surveyed case study areas could not meet these requirements and therefore did not qualify for land-use rights. In many cases where informal settlements had arisen on public lands, land and houses had simply been transferred in informal deals, without verification by the local authority. In the surveyed case study areas, only 4.6% of households had legal housing documents. The occupants of the Thanh Cong rubbish dump had no legal documents at all.

Significant reforms were introduced in 2004 under a new Land Law. There is now formal recognition of real estate markets, legal certificates for house ownership and devolution of responsibility to local governments for land administration and registry. Land-use certificates have been consolidated into a single type and there have been improvements in compensation procedures for expropriated land (Coulthart et al., 2006). This allows for limited public participation in planning and the adoption of land values that are close to market values instead of being set by the government. In Vietnam all tax collections are centralized, so there is a lack of material revenue autonomy by local governments. The main challenges are in building the necessary capacities in local government for urban management to meet the changing needs in the city.

Comparative lessons learned

The slum upgrading experiences in the three South East Asian cities reported here were very mixed in terms of outcomes. In reference to Fig. 2, the most significant achievements have been in terms of physical capital (infrastructure and housing) and in some cases community capacity building (social and human capital) during upgrading, while the post-upgrading phase has been the least successful. In some cases major gains were made in access to more secure forms of land tenure. Some social capital experiments, albeit short-term, showed promise as effective future models for community engagement. The longer-term economic improvement necessary to lift slum residents out of poverty permanently, however, has remained elusive.

Tenure security

Land and house tenure were of concern in all communities studied. Without some form of security, residents of informal settlements felt they had no base upon which to build permanent livelihoods. Tenure security is an “all-important element of housing security” (Bredenoord & van Lindert, 2010: 279); Security of tenure is not necessarily equated to fully titled ownership. The five communities in Quezon City were moving to relative security through titling but there were unresolved issues relating to repayment of loans. There is a pointer here to Mukhija’s (2002) concern that upgrading should consider property values (and costs) as well as property tenure and physical assets. At the other extreme, in Hanoi access to titling was unattainable under the system of public land ownership but tenure security was hindered by the complex system of rights and permissions needed.

Social capital and community participation

For many residents in the case study areas informal land occupancy was encouraged by chain migration through connections with family and friends. Commonly blocks of houses were occupied by migrants from the same areas or people who were related through kinship.

These existing social capital networks allowed residents to engage in collective action so that they could bring some physical order into their new communities and undertake initial improvements. Those who were able to tap into water, electricity and other resources (legally or informally) often shared these with neighbours. Mutual cooperation, trust, shared needs and concerns, propelled them together as they negotiated through bureaucratic layers and procedures in pursuit of improvements.

Community participation was a key strategy in the physical upgrading projects undertaken in the study sites, from project identification and planning to procurement of materials and provision of labour, although the level and form of this participation varied enormously. Community leaders played a vital role in terms of motivating residents to participate in upgrading activities. Villagers trusted community elders and leaders; with their help a high degree of involvement was achieved. Community readiness to be involved in the programs was essential to long-term success.

The role of NGOs was central in Quezon City but other researchers (Winayanti & Lang, 2004) have demonstrated the importance of these organisations elsewhere. They are critical in both the development and implementation of many slum upgrading programs.

Economic and livelihood enhancement

In 2008 most of the case study communities remained on a knife-edge of poverty. In the post-upgrading phase of slum improvement there was still much to be done in terms of increasing livelihood opportunities.

Cooperatives set up in Bandung and Quezon City were initially relatively successful but lacked the financial depth to continue operating. They were vulnerable to national financial crises. Skills-based training opportunities had been included in some upgrading programs but were under-utilised. Despite notable physical transformation of targeted areas, insufficient attention had been given to the economic capacity of the tenants to maintain their physical assets and to generate on-going income to service their debts. Survey data did not reveal any indicators of marked improvements in income, livelihood or skills upgrading. Although housed in better accommodation and with better infrastructure, residents mainly remained in a state of income poverty.

Micro-financing initiatives were partially successful with funds being injected into existing small retail or manufacturing businesses. Only a small proportion of the borrowers engaged in new business ventures, however, and the programs suffered from a low repayment rate. In Quezon City selected young residents were provided with scholarships for vocational trade courses which were utilized through a homeowners’ association cooperative.

Governance and Institutions

The top-down, centralised, implementation of the early programs was problematic because community participation was poorly articulated. Community participation needed to be included from the planning stage, because projects that involved community
participation only during the implementation stage did not gain proper public support.

In all three cities there were difficulties translating national slum upgrading policies and transferring funds to the city and local government levels, which ultimately had the devolved responsibilities for making such programs work. The often overly complex institutional and administrative arrangements stifled efforts to ameliorate slum conditions.

Governance and institutional arrangements are crucial elements of slum upgrading in the longer term. The Baan Mankong project in Thailand (Archer, 2012: 178) may provide lessons in that it involved a new “para-statal” organization, the Community Organisations Development Institute” which worked closely with communities to build up aspects of social capital.

Institutions and tenure are connected. The Baan Mankong project also worked with tenure structures where land was controlled by communities rather than individuals, an illustration of the variety of possible approaches to increasing tenure security in slums. Handzic’s (2010: 11) study of the Favela Bairra program in Rio de Janeiro claims that “the full regularization of land tenure through land titling is not essential in the slum upgrading process”. Payne (2004) identifies the range of forms of formal and informal tenure possible in relation to property rights, with fully documented titling being only one of these. Institutional capacities underpin formal and informal structures that can provide forms of tenure security but in the case studies the ultimate goal of enhanced governance arrangements had yet to be attained.

Conclusions

The scale of physical upgrading and gains in tenure security acquired by the case study communities was not complemented by an equally definitive boost in the households’ livelihood opportunities. This posed a significant challenge to the residents if they needed to regularly set aside part of their income for land amortization and site development costs. Resolution of this issue is critical if on-going maintenance of slum upgrading and sustainability of communities emerging from poverty is to be achieved.

The case studies illustrate but did not directly address a fundamental issue about slum upgrading, which is the problem of up-scaling projects from small neighbourhoods to whole segments of cities and so fitting slum upgrading within the general policy environment of cities. So long as slums are seen as special areas that need special programs they will never become part of the city planning.

The three case studies have shown that issues of security of tenure (in a very broad sense), governance and institutional arrangements, public participation (including the effective contributions of civil society), up-scaling and extension of programs, and the connections between slum upgrading and sustainable livelihoods are crucial aspects of the effective development and implementation of slum upgrading programs. None of the case studies described in this research were totally successful in their slum upgrading but each provided lessons that can be incorporated into future program development.

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